Who Can Legally Require Social Security Number

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Section 8053(a) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, P.L. 101-508, requires that the SSN be granted to any person who applies for benefits under Department of Veterans Affairs programs. This section also requires the Social Security number (if assigned) of a dependant or beneficiary on whose behalf a person is applying for Veteran`s benefits. 38 U.S.C. §5101(c)(1). Section 2422 of the Consumer Credit Information Reform Act of 1996, Subtitle D of P.L. 104-208, requires the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve and the FTC to conduct a study into whether private organizations (other than those subject to the Fair Credit Reporting Act) disclose sensitive consumer identification information to the public. including social security numbers. 15 U.S.C. §1681a Note.

Section 4 of the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1981, the Social Security Benefits Act, P.L. 97-123, amends the Social Security Act to include altering and falsifying a social security card in the list of prohibited acts, and increases penalties for such acts under section 208 of the Social Security Act. 42 U.S.C. §408. However, other courts, including the Seventh and Eleventh Courts of Appeals, have held otherwise, holding that the recourse provision in section 3, which applies strictly to federal agencies, does not apply to section 7, which applies to federal, state and local agencies under its express terms. See Schwier v. Cox, 340 f.3d 1284, 1292 (11th Cir. 2003); see also Gonzalez v. Vill. by W. Milwaukee, 671 F.3d 649, 661-63 (7th Cir.

2012). In Schwier, the court concluded that “Congress has created a `clearly conferred right` in Section 7 of the Privacy Act,” arguing that Section 7 under Section 42 U.S.C. can be enforced. Section 1983, which “provides for a private right of action where a person has been deprived of a federal constitutional or statutory right under state law” because “the recourse provision in section 3 does not support the conclusion that Congress intended to exclude private remedies under section 1983 for violations of section 7.” Schwier, 340 F.3d to 1289-90, 1292. According to the argument of the Eleventh Judicial District in the Schwier case, the Seventh Judicial District in the Gonzalez case found “no conflict between Articles 3 and 7 [of the Data Protection Act]”, because “it seems clear that if Article 3(a)(1) defines the authorities as federal authorities `for the purposes of this Article`, it refers only to Article 3. Accordingly, it is not necessary to look beyond the unequivocal wording of paragraph 7 to determine its applicability. Paragraph 7 shall expressly apply to federal, regional and local authorities. Gonzalez, 671 F.3d to 662. See also Lanzetta v. Woodmansee, No.

2:13-cv-276, 2013 WL 1610508, at *2 (according to Schwier and stating: “An individual may also pursue the enforcement of his or her right to privacy under section 7 of the Privacy Act under [42 U.S.C. § 1983]; River Port Auth., 630 F. Supp. 2d 426, 445 (D.N.J. 2009) (ruling that the Delaware River Port Authority`s requirement that a social security number be provided in order to obtain a senior “E-Z” pass violates Section 7, which was enforceable under Ex Parte Young); Szymecki v. Norfolk, No. 2:08cv142, 2008 WL 4223620, at *9 (E.D. Va. 11 Sept.

2008) (concluding that “because section 7 confers a legal right on individuals and because Congress has a legal remedy under [42 U.S.C.] § 1983 for violations of § 7. Violations of Article 7 are enforceable under § 1983”); Stollenwerk v. Miller, Nr. 04-5510, 2006 WL 463393, at *3-7 (E.D. Pa. 24, 2006) (concluding that state law requiring the presentation of a Social Security number for the purchase of a handgun was invalid because Section 7 is enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Libertarian Party v. Ehrler, 776 F.

Supp. 1200, 1209 (E.D. Ky. 1991) (the requirement for voters to include the social security number on the petition for signature violates the Data Protection Act); see Lawson v. Shelby Cnty., Tenn., 211 F.3d at p. 335 (Permission of the plains` request for prospective injunctive relief [to enforce Section 7 of the Privacy Act] against [government] officials” under Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)); Greidinger v. Almand, 30 F.

Supp.3d 413, 426-27 (D. Md. 2014) (noting that the private right of action has been recognized in certain circumstances, although the question of whether “a person has an implied private right of action under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 for violating section 7 of the federal Privacy Act is an open question in the Fourth Circuit”) (citing White v. Cain, 2:10-CV-01182, 2011 WL 1087489, at *7 (N.D. W. Va. 21 Mar. 2011)).

Contra Treesh, 2010 WL 3603553, at *3 (“If the disclosure of the applicant`s medical information in any way violates the Data Protection Act, [the applicant] still does not bring a federal claim” because “Section 1983 cannot be used to remedy violations of the Data Protection Act”); Bush v. Lancaster Bureau of Police, No. 07-3172, 2008 WL 3930290, at *7-8 (E.D. Pa. August 28, 2008) (finding that “the plaintiff may not bring an action under [42 U.S.C. § 1983] for violation of Section 7(b) of the Privacy Act” because “the court, after reviewing the legal wording, cannot conclude: that Congress created a “clear right” on individuals).